When we have absolutely no understanding of the causes of an action—whether vicious or virtuous or simply non…moral—we ascribe a greater element of free will to it。 In the case of a crime； we are more urgent in demanding punishment for the act； in the case of a virtuous act； we are warmer in our appreciation of its merits。 In cases of no moral bearing； we recognise more individuality； originality； and independence in it。 But if only one of the innumerable causes of the act is known to us； we recognise a certain element of necessity； and are less ready to exact punishment for the crime； to acknowledge merit in the virtuous act； or freedom in the apparent originality。 The fact that the criminal was reared in vicious surroundings softens his fault in our eyes。 The self…sacrifice of a father； of a mother； or self…sacrifice with the possibility of reward is more comprehensible than gratuitous self…sacrifice； and so is regarded by us as less deserving of sympathy and less the work of free will。 The founder of a sect； of a party； or the inventor impresses us less when we understand how and by what the way was paved for his activity。 If we have a large range of experiments； if our observation is continually directed to seeking correlations in men’s actions between causes and effects； their actions will seem to us more necessary and less free； the more accurately we connect causes and effects。 If the actions investigated are simple； and we have had a vast number of such actions under observation； our conception of their inevitability will be even more complete。 The dishonest conduct of the son of a dishonest father； the misbehaviour of women； who have been led into certain surroundings； the relapse of the reformed drunkard into drunkenness； and so on； are instances of conduct which seem to us to be less free the better we understand their cause。 If the man himself whose conduct we are examining is on the lowest stage of mental development； like a child； a mad…man； or a simpleton； then when we know the causes of the act and the simplicity of the character and intelligence； we see so great an element of necessity； and so little free will； that we can foretell the act that will follow； as soon as we know the cause bound to bring it forth。
In all legislative codes the exoneration of crime or admission of mitigating circumstances rests only on those three classes of consideration。 The guilt is conceived as greater or less according to the greater or lesser knowledge of the conditions in which the man judged is placed； the greater or less interval of time between the perpetration of the crime and the judgment of it； and the greater or less comprehension of the causes that led to the act。
Chapter 10
AND THUS our conception of free will and necessity is gradually diminished or increased according to the degree of connection with the external world； the degree of remoteness in time； and the degree of dependence on causes which we see in the phenomenon of man’s life that we examine。 So that if we examine the case of a man in which the connection with the external world is better known； the interval of time between the examination and the act greater； and the causes of the action easier to comprehend； we form a conception of a greater element of necessity and less free will。 If we examine a man in a less close dependence on external conditions； if his action is committed at a moment nearer the present； and the causes leading him to it are beyond our ken； we form a conception of a less element of necessity and a greater element of free will in his action。
But in neither case； however we shift our point of view； however clear we make to ourselves the connection in which the man is placed with the external world； or however fully comprehensible it may appear to us； however long or short a period of time we select； however explicable or unfathomable the causes of the act may be to us； we can never conceive of complete free will； nor of complete necessity in any action。
1。 However carefully we imagine a man excluded from the influence of the external world； we can never form a conception of freedom in space。 Every act of man’s is inevitably limited by what surrounds him and by his own body。 I raise my arm and let it fall。 My action seems to me free； but asking myself could I raise my arm in any direction； I see that I moved it in the direction in which there was least hindrance to the action arising from bodies around me or from the construction of my own body。 I chose one out of all the possible directions； because in that direction I met with least hindrance。 For my action to be entirely free； it would have to meet with no hindrance in any direction。 To conceive a man quite free； we have to conceive him outside of space； which is obviously impossible。
2。 However near we bring the time of criticism to the time of action； we can never form a conception of freedom in time。 For if I examine an act committed a second ago； I must still recognise that it is not free； since the act is irrevocably linked to the moment at which it was committed。 Can I lift my arm？ I lift it； but I ask myself： Could I not have lifted my arm in that moment of time that has just passed？ To convince myself of that； I do not lift my arm the next moment。 But I am not abstaining from lifting it that first moment of which I asked myself the question。 The time has gone by and to detain it was not in my power； and the hand which I then raised and the air in which I raised it are not the same as the hand I do not raise now or the air in which I do not now raise it。 The moment in which the first movement took place is irrevocable； and in that moment I could only perform one action； and whatever movement I had made； that movement could have been the only one。 The fact that the following moment I abstained from lifting my arm did not prove that I could have abstained from lifting it。 And since my movement could only be one in one moment of time； it could have been no other。 To conceive it to oneself as free； one must conceive it in the present on the boundary between the past and the future； that is； outside time； which is impossible。
3。 However we increase the degree of difficulty of comprehending the causes of the act； we never reach a conception of complete free will； that is； absolute absence of cause。 Though the cause of the expression of will in any act of our own or another’s may be beyond our ken； it is the first impulse of the intellect to presuppose and seek a cause； without which no phenomenon is conceivable。 I raise my arm in order to perform an act independent of any cause； but the fact that I want to perform an act independent of any cause is the cause of my action。
But even if by conceiving a man entirely excluded from external influence； and exercising only a momentary act in the present； not called forth by any cause； we were to reduce the element of necessity to an infinitesimal minimum equivalent to nil； we should even then not have reached a conception of complete free will in a man； for a creature； uninfluenced by the external world； outside of time； and independent of cause； is no longer a man。
In the same way we can never conceive a human action subject only to necessity without any element of free will。
1。 However we increase our knowledge of the conditions of space in which a man is placed； that knowledge can never be complete since the number of these conditions is infinitely great； seeing that space is in finite。 And so long as not all the conditions that may influence a man are defined； the circle of necessity is not complete； and there is still a loophole for free will。
2。 Though we may make the period of time intervening between an act and our criticism of it as long as we choose； that period will be finite； and time is infinite； and so in this respect too the circle of necessity is not complete。
3。 However easy the chain of causation of any act may be to grasp； we shall never know the whole chain； since it is endless； and so again we cannot attain absolute necessity。
But apart from that； even if； reducing the minimum of free will till it is equivalent to nil； we were to admit in some case—as； for instance； that of a dying man； an unborn babe；