otherwise the former is quite undetermined； and one phenomenon is
not distinguishable from another。 The former alone proves nothing as
to the connection of the manifold in an object； for it is quite
arbitrary。 The latter must consist in the order of the manifold in a
phenomenon； according to which order the apprehension of one thing
（that which happens） follows that of another thing （which precedes）；
in conformity with a rule。 In this way alone can I be authorized to
say of the phenomenon itself； and not merely of my own apprehension；
that a certain order or sequence is to be found therein。 That is； in
other words； I cannot arrange my apprehension otherwise than in this
order。
In conformity with this rule； then； it is necessary that in that
which antecedes an event there be found the condition of a rule；
according to which in this event follows always and necessarily； but I
cannot reverse this and go back from the event； and determine （by
apprehension） that which antecedes it。 For no phenomenon goes back
from the succeeding point of time to the preceding point； although
it does certainly relate to a preceding point of time； from a given
time； on the other hand； there is always a necessary progression to
the determined succeeding time。 Therefore； because there certainly
is something that follows； I must of necessity connect it with
something else； which antecedes； and upon which it follows； in
conformity with a rule； that is necessarily； so that the event； as
conditioned； affords certain indication of a condition； and this
condition determines the event。
Let us suppose that nothing precedes an event； upon which this event
must follow in conformity with a rule。 All sequence of perception
would then exist only in apprehension； that is to say； would be merely
subjective； and it could not thereby be objectively determined what
thing ought to precede； and what ought to follow in perception。 In
such a case； we should have nothing but a play of representations；
which would possess no application to any object。 That is to say； it
would not be possible through perception to distinguish one phenomenon
from another； as regards relations of time； because the succession
in the act of apprehension would always be of the same sort； and
therefore there would be nothing in the phenomenon to determine the
succession； and to render a certain sequence objectively necessary。
And； in this case； I cannot say that two states in a phenomenon follow
one upon the other； but only that one apprehension follows upon
another。 But this is merely subjective； and does not determine an
object； and consequently cannot be held to be cognition of an
object… not even in the phenomenal world。
Accordingly； when we know in experience that something happens； we
always presuppose that something precedes； whereupon it follows in
conformity with a rule。 For otherwise I could not say of the object
that it follows； because the mere succession in my apprehension； if it
be not determined by a rule in relation to something preceding； does
not authorize succession in the object。 Only； therefore； in
reference to a rule； according to which phenomena are determined in
their sequence； that is； as they happen； by the preceding state； can I
make my subjective synthesis （of apprehension） objective； and it is
only under this presupposition that even the experience of an event is
possible。
No doubt it appears as if this were in thorough contradiction to all
the notions which people have hitherto entertained in regard to the
procedure of the human understanding。 According to these opinions；
it is by means of the perception and parison of similar
consequences following upon certain antecedent phenomena that the
understanding is led to the discovery of a rule； according to which
certain events always follow certain phenomena； and it is only by this
process that we attain to the conception of cause。 Upon such a
basis； it is clear that this conception must be merely empirical；
and the rule which it furnishes us with… 〃Everything that happens must
have a cause〃… would be just as contingent as experience itself。 The
universality and necessity of the rule or law would be perfectly
spurious attributes of it。 Indeed； it could not possess universal
validity； inasmuch as it would not in this case be a priori； but
founded on deduction。 But the same is the case with this law as with
other pure a priori representations （e。g。； space and time）； which we
can draw in perfect clearness and pleteness from experience； only
because we had already placed them therein； and by that means； and
by that alone； had rendered experience possible。 Indeed； the logical
clearness of this representation of a rule； determining the series
of events； is possible only when we have made use thereof in
experience。 Nevertheless； the recognition of this rule； as a condition
of the synthetical unity of phenomena in time； was the ground of
experience itself and consequently preceded it a priori。
It is now our duty to show by an example that we never； even in
experience； attribute to an object the notion of succession or
effect （of an event… that is； the happening of something that did
not exist before）； and distinguish it from the subjective succession
of apprehension； unless when a rule lies at the foundation； which
pels us to observe this order of perception in preference to any
other； and that； indeed； it is this necessity which first renders
possible the representation of a succession in the object。
We have representations within us； of which also we can be
conscious。 But； however widely extended； however accurate and
thoroughgoing this consciousness may be； these representations are
still nothing more than representations； that is； internal
determinations of the mind in this or that relation of time。 Now how
happens it that to these representations we should set an object； or
that； in addition to their subjective reality； as modifications； we
should still further attribute to them a certain unknown objective
reality？ It is clear that objective significancy cannot consist in a
relation to another representation （of that which we desire to term
object）； for in that case the question again arises： 〃How does this
other representation go out of itself； and obtain objective
significancy over and above the subjective； which is proper to it；
as a determination of a state of mind？〃 If we try to discover what
sort of new property the relation to an object gives to our subjective
representations； and what new importance they thereby receive； we
shall find that this relation has no other effect than that of
rendering necessary the connection of our representations in a certain
manner； and of subjecting them to a rule； and that conversely； it is
only because a certain order is necessary in the relations of time
of our representations； that objective significancy is ascribed to
them。
In the synthesis of phenomena； the manifold of our representations
is always successive。 Now hereby is not represented an object； for
by means of this succession； which is mon to all apprehension； no
one thing is distinguished from another。 But so soon as I perceive
or assume that in this succession there is a relation to a state
antecedent； from which the representation follows in accordance with a
rule； so soon do I represent something as an event； or as a thing that
happens； in other words； I cognize an object to which I must assign
a certain determinate position in time； which cannot be altered；
because of the preceding state in the object。 When； therefore； I
perceive that something happens； there is contained in this
representation； in the first place； the fact； that something
antecedes； because； it。 is only in relation to this that the
phenomenon obtains its proper relation of time； in other words； exists
after an antecedent time； in which it did not exist。 But it can
receive its determined place in time only by the presupposition that
something existed in the foregoing state； upon which it follows
inevitably and always； that is； in conformity with a rule。 From all
this it is evident that； in the first place； I cannot reverse th