it has bee familiar from constant use。 And； at last； all
speculative interests disappear before the practical interests which
it holds dear； and it fancies that it understands and knows what its
necessities and hopes incite it to assume or to believe。 Thus the
empiricism of transcendentally idealizing reason is robbed of all
popularity； and； however prejudicial it may be to the highest
practical principles； there is no fear that it will ever pass the
limits of the schools； or acquire any favour or influence in society
or with the multitude a
Human reason is by nature architectonic。 That is to say； it
regards all cognitions as parts of a possible system； and hence
accepts only such principles as at least do not incapacitate a
cognition to which we may have attained from being placed along with
others in a general system。 But the propositions of the antithesis are
of a character which renders the pletion of an edifice of
cognitions impossible。 According to these； beyond one state or epoch
of the world there is always to be found one more ancient； in every
part always other parts themselves divisible； preceding every event
another； the origin of which must itself be sought still higher； and
everything in existence is conditioned； and still not dependent on
an unconditioned and primal existence。 As； therefore； the antithesis
will not concede the existence of a first beginning which might be
available as a foundation； a plete edifice of cognition； in the
presence of such hypothesis； is utterly impossible。 Thus the
architectonic interest of reason； which requires a unity… not
empirical； but a priori and rational… forms a natural remendation
for the assertions of the thesis in our antinomy。
But if any one could free himself entirely from all considerations
of interest； and weigh without partiality the assertions of reason；
attending only to their content； irrespective of the consequences
which follow from them； such a person； on the supposition that he knew
no other way out of the confusion than to settle the truth of one or
other of the conflicting doctrines； would live in a state of continual
hesitation。 Today； he would feel convinced that the human will is
free； to…morrow； considering the indissoluble chain of nature； he
would look on freedom as a mere illusion and declare nature to be
all…in…all。 But； if he were called to action； the play of the merely
speculative reason would disappear like the shapes of a dream； and
practical interest would dictate his choice of principles。 But； as
it well befits a reflective and inquiring being to devote certain
periods of time to the examination of its own reason… to divest itself
of all partiality； and frankly to municate its observations for the
judgement and opinion of others； so no one can be blamed for； much
less prevented from； placing both parties on their trial； with
permission to end themselves； free from intimidation； before
intimidation； before a sworn jury of equal condition with
themselves… the condition of weak and fallible men。
SECTION IV。 Of the necessity imposed upon Pure Reason
of presenting a Solution of its Transcendental
Problems。
To avow an ability to solve all problems and to answer all questions
would be a profession certain to convict any philosopher of
extravagant boasting and self…conceit； and at once to destroy the
confidence that might otherwise have been reposed in him。 There are；
however； sciences so constituted that every question arising within
their sphere must necessarily be capable of receiving an answer from
the knowledge already possessed； for the answer must be received
from the same sources whence the question arose。 In such sciences it
is not allowable to excuse ourselves on the plea of necessary and
unavoidable ignorance； a solution is absolutely requisite。 The rule of
right and wrong must help us to the knowledge of what is right or
wrong in all possible cases； otherwise； the idea of obligation or duty
would be utterly null； for we cannot have any obligation to that which
we cannot know。 On the other hand； in our investigations of the
phenomena of nature； much must remain uncertain； and many questions
continue insoluble； because what we know of nature is far from being
sufficient to explain all the phenomena that are presented to our
observation。 Now the question is： 〃Whether there is in
transcendental philosophy any question； relating to an object
presented to pure reason； which is unanswerable by this reason； and
whether we must regard the subject of the question as quite uncertain；
so far as our knowledge extends； and must give it a place among
those subjects； of which we have just so much conception as is
sufficient to enable us to raise a question… faculty or materials
failing us； however； when we attempt an answer。 the world
Now I maintain that； among all speculative cognition； the
peculiarity of transcendental philosophy is that there is no question；
relating to an object presented to pure reason； which is insoluble
by this reason； and that the profession of unavoidable ignorance…
the problem being alleged to be beyond the reach of our faculties…
cannot free us from the obligation to present a plete and
satisfactory answer。 For the very conception which enables us to raise
the question must give us the power of answering it； inasmuch as the
object； as in the case of right and wrong； is not to be discovered out
of the conception。
But； in transcendental philosophy； it is only the cosmological
questions to which we can demand a satisfactory answer in relation
to the constitution of their object； and the philosopher is not
permitted to avail himself of the pretext of necessary ignorance and
impenetrable obscurity。 These questions relate solely to the
cosmological ideas。 For the object must be given in experience； and
the question relates to the adequateness of the object to an idea。
If the object is transcendental and therefore itself unknown； if the
question； for example； is whether the object… the something； the
phenomenon of which （internal… in ourselves） is thought… that is to
say； the soul； is in itself a simple being； or whether there is a
cause of all things； which is absolutely necessary… in such cases we
are seeking for our idea an object； of which we may confess that it is
unknown to us； though we must not on that account assert that it is
impossible。* The cosmological ideas alone posses the peculiarity
that we can presuppose the object of them and the empirical
synthesis requisite for the conception of that object to be given； and
the question； which arises from these ideas； relates merely to the
progress of this synthesis； in so far as it must contain absolute
totality… which； however； is not empirical； as it cannot be given in
any experience。 Now； as the question here is solely in regard to a
thing as the object of a possible experience and not as a thing in
itself； the answer to the transcendental cosmological question need
not be sought out of the idea； for the question does not regard an
object in itself。 The question in relation to a possible experience is
not； 〃What can be given in an experience in concreto〃 but 〃what is
contained in the idea； to which the empirical synthesis must
approximate。〃 The question must therefore be capable of solution
from the idea alone。 For the idea is a creation of reason itself；
which therefore cannot disclaim the obligation to answer or refer us
to the unknown object。
*The question； 〃What is the constitution of a transcendental
object？〃 is unanswerable… we are unable to say what it is； but we
can perceive that the question itself is nothing； because it does
not relate to any object that can be presented to us。 For this reason；
we must consider all the questions raised in transcendental psychology
as answerable and as really answered； for they relate to the
transcendental subject of all internal phenomena； which is not
itself phenomenon and consequently not given as an object； in which；
moreover； none of the categories… and it is to them that the
question is properly directed… find any conditions of its application。
Her