ncreases were 12。9％； 11。1％； 5。7％； and 5。6％。 In 1988； the revenue gain is certain to be far below our 10％ 〃equilibrium〃 figure。 Clearly； the party is over。
然而盈余数字却不会马上滑落，这个产业具有递延的现象，因为大部分的保单都是一年期，所以对于损益的影响会在往后的一年之间陆续浮现，因此打个比方，在party结束、酒吧关门之前，你还可以把手上的那杯喝完了再走，假设往后几年没有发生什么天灾地变，我们预期1988年的同业平均综合比率将会微幅上扬，紧接下来的几年则会大幅攀升。
However； earnings will not immediately sink。 A lag factor exists in this industry： Because most policies are written for a one…year term； higher or lower insurance prices do not have their full impact on earnings until many months after they go into effect。 Thus； to resume our metaphor； when the party ends and the bar is closed； you are allowed to finish your drink。 If results are not hurt by a major natural catastrophe； we predict a small climb for the industry's bined ratio in 1988； followed by several years of larger increases。
保险业最近受到几项不利的经济因素所困而前景黯淡，数以百计的竞争对手、进入障碍低、无法大幅差异化的产品特性，在这种类似商品型产业之中，只有营运成本低的公司或是一些受到保护的利基产品才有可能有长期获利成长的机会。
The insurance industry is cursed with a set of dismal economic characteristics that make for a poor long…term outlook： hundreds of petitors； ease of entry； and a product that cannot be differentiated in any meaningful way。 In such a modity…like business； only a very low…cost operator or someone operating in a protected； and usually small； niche can sustain high profitability levels。
当产品供给短缺时，即使是商品化产业也能蓬勃发展，不过在保险业界，这种好日子早就已经过去了，资本主义最讽刺的地方就是商品型产业大部分的经理人都痛恨商品短缺不足，但偏偏这是唯一可能让这些公司有获利的机会，当短缺出现时，经理人便会迫不及待地想要扩充产能，这无异是将源源不断流入现金的水龙头关掉一样，这就是过去三年保险公司经理人的最佳写照，再次验证Disraeli的名言：「我们唯一从历史得到的教训就是我们从来无法从历史得到教训！」
When shortages exist； however； even modity businesses flourish。 The insurance industry enjoyed that kind of climate for a while but it is now gone。 One of the ironies of capitalism is that most managers in modity industries abhor shortage conditions … even though those are the only circumstances permitting them good returns。 Whenever shortages appear； the typical manager simply can't wait to expand capacity and thereby plug the hole through which money is showering upon him。 This is precisely what insurance managers did in 1985…87； confirming again Disraeli's observation： 〃What we learn from history is that we do not learn from history。〃
在Berkshire，我们努力避免自己的公司成为商品化的企业，首先我们凭借着自己强大的资金实力，来凸显我们产品的不同，但这种效果实在是有限，尤其在个人险的部份，因为即使是其所投保的保险公司倒闭（事实上这种状况还不少），汽车险或或房屋险的购买者仍可获得理赔，在商业险的部份也是如此，当情况好时，许多大企业投保户与保险掮客都不太关心保险业者的财务状况，即使是比较复杂的案件，顶多拖个三、五年，最后还是有办法可以解决， （眼不见为净的结果，可能会让你的口袋落空）
At Berkshire； we work to escape the industry's modity economics in two ways。 First； we differentiate our product by our financial strength； which exceeds that of all others in the industry。 This strength； however； is limited in its usefulness。 It means nothing in the personal insurance field： The buyer of an auto or homeowners policy is going to get his claim paid even if his insurer fails （as many have）。 It often means nothing in the mercial insurance arena： When times are good； many major corporate purchasers of insurance and their brokers pay scant attention to the insurer's ability to perform under the more adverse conditions that may exist； say； five years later when a plicated claim is finally resolved。 （Out of sight； out of mind … and； later on； maybe out…of…pocket。）
不过一段期间保户会偶尔想起富兰克林所说的空沙包很难站的直挺，并了解寻找一个可靠稳定的保险公司的重要性，这时我们发挥优势的机会就来了，当客户认真想到往后五到十年，若是面对景气不佳同时又碰上金融市场低迷，再保业者倒闭频繁等景象时，而怀疑保险公司是否仍有能力轻松地支付一千万美元理赔金时，那么他可以挑选的保险公司其实是相当有限的，在所有的沙包之中，Berkshire无疑是站得最直挺的一个。
Periodically； however； buyers remember Ben Franklin's observation that it is hard for an empty sack to stand upright and recognize their need to buy promises only from insurers that have enduring financial strength。 It is then that we have a major petitive advantage。 When a buyer really focuses on whether a 10 million claim can be easily paid by his insurer five or ten years down the road； and when he takes into account the possibility that poor underwriting conditions may then coincide with depressed financial markets and defaults by reinsurer； he will find only a few panies he can trust。 Among those； Berkshire will lead the pack。 Our second method of differentiating ourselves is the total indifference to volume that we maintain。 In 1989； we will be perfectly willing to write five times as much business as we write in 1988 … or only one…fifth as much。 We hope； of course； that conditions will allow us large volume。 But we cannot control market prices。 If they are unsatisfactory； we will simply do very little business。 No other major insurer acts with equal restraint。
我们第二个方法是试着让我们完全不理会签发保单的数量，在下一个年度我们很愿意一口气签出比前一年多五倍的保单，但若是只能签发五分之一的保单也无所谓，当然情况若许可我们希望是越多越好，但我们实在是无法掌握市场价格，若价格不理想，我们就会暂时退出市场少做一点生意，在同业中再没有其它任何一家保险公司有我们如此高的自制力。
Three conditions that prevail in insurance； but not in most businesses； allow us our flexibility。 First； market share is not an important determinant of profitability： In this business； in contrast to the newspaper or grocery businesses； the economic rule is not survival of the fattest。 Second； in many sectors of insurance； including most of those in which we operate； distribution channels are not proprietary and can be easily entered： Small volume this year does not preclude huge volume next year。 Third； idle capacity … which in this industry largely means people … does not result in intolerable costs。 In a way that industries such as printing or steel cannot； we can operate at quarter…speed much of the time and still enjoy long…term prosperity。
在保险业普遍存在的第三种情况，（这在其它产业并不多见）使得我们能保持相当的弹性，第一市场占有率并不绝对等于获利率，不像新闻业或是零售业，最后能够存活的不一定是最肥的那个人，第二许多的保险类种，其中也包含我们所从事的主要险种，销售通路并非只有唯一管道，所以进入障碍低，今年业绩不多，不代表明年就一定会很少，第三闲置的产能，在保险业来说主要是在于人力，这部份并不会造成太大的负担，在印刷或是钢铁业的话就不是如此，我们可以在保持慢速前进的同时，随时蓄势待发准备向前冲刺。
We follow a price…based…on…exposure； not…on…petition policy because it makes sense for our shareholders。 But we're happy to report that it is also pro…social。 This policy means that we are always available； given prices that we believe are adequate； to write huge volumes of almost any type of property…casualty insurance。 Many other insurers follow an in…and…out approach。 When they are 〃out〃 … because of mounting losses； capital inadequacy； or whatever … we are available。 Of course； when others are panting to do business we are also available … but at such times we often find ourselves priced above the market。 In effect； we supply insurance buyers and brokers with a large reservoir of standby capacity。
我们完全以价格为导向（而非竞争）来决定我们的风险部位，因为如此对于股东投资者才有意义，但同时我们也很高兴，因为这对社会同样也有助益，这个原则代表我们随时准备就绪，只要市场价格合理，我们愿意随时进场承接任何产物意外险的保单，配合许多保险同业遵循的进出策略，当他们因为损失扩大、资本不足等原因退出市场时，我们随时可以接替，当然当一些同业进来杀价抢食市场时，虽然我们也愿意继续服务大众，但由于我们的报价高于市场价格，所以只好暂时退出观望，基本上我们扮演的是市场供需调节的角色。
One story from mid…1987 illustrates some consequences of our pricing policy： One of the largest family…owned insurance brokers in the country is headed by a fellow who has long been a shareholder of Berkshire